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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT.
.
A state administrative commission has taken property from a contractor under color of a contract without due process of law. The contractor's property has
been merged into a state structure so tqat it is impossible to recover the identical property. The commission has under its control and i:;ubject to its order
funds appropriated by the legislature to meet such
claims as the contractor presents. It ignores his de. mands for payment. Thereupon he brings an action
· against theµi in their official capacities for equitable
relief. The attorney general of the state appears and
·sets up the Eleventh Amendment. Who should preVail?
.
American Constitution may be compared to an organism
T HEitself
with high nervous development that enables it to adapt
to changes. in its env'ironment or even to new environ~

ments. As such an organism is the result of evolution, so is our
Federal Constitution the product of centuries of human experience in the science of government. Probably most of the great
political philosophers of all ages have donated their mite to the
finished product. To MONTESQUIEU we owe in part, at least, our
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers.
The division by the Constitutional Fathers of the exercise of
governmental powers among the several departments of the government, and especially between State and Nation, made difficult the
problem of the location in the American state of that indivisible
sovereignty necessary in every state. The Federal Government
does not possess it, for the doctrine of split or delegated powers is
clearly sound. A great civil war and organized force decided that
the local unit or individual State was not sovereign; that no State
or minority of States had supreme power.
WooDROW WILSON in his "State" describes a sovereign as "a
determinate person, or body of persons to whom the bulk of the
members of an organized community are in the habit of rendering
obedience and who are themselves not in the habit of rendering
obedience to any human superior." The separation of the powers
of government between the different departments of American government makes it impossible for any one department to answer
the requirements of political sovereignty. It may most correctly
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be said to lodge in the American electorate, for that legal branch
of our government possesses ultimately "a complete freedom from
legal control of any other power whatever." It is limited in its
exercise of supreme political powers only by the time it takes its
selected agents to execute its mandates as revealed at each election,
and a continued belief in their wisdom by the necessary numerical
majority. Sovereignty in America must be said to reside in the
·electorate, or, expressed more loosely, in the people, for Public
Opinion or the Public Mind controls the electorate.
In 1793 the doctrine of State Rights or State sovereignty took
its first embarrassing form when one CHISHOI,M tried to sue the
State of Georgia in an action of assumpsit. An immunity from suit
was at once claimed on the grotind of sovereignty. Br,ACKSTONE in
his COMMENTARIES expresses the doctrine of sovereignty's immunity
from suit as follows: "The law ascnoes to the King the attnoute of
sovereignty; he is sovereign and independent within his own dominions and owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate on
earth. Hence it is that no suit or action can be brought against
the King even in civil matters because no court can have jurisdiction over him, for all jurisdiction implies superiority of power."1
After due deliberation the United States Supreme Court decided
the action was maintainable. The Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution was the answer of political America. McMAsTER in
his "HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPI.E" reports: "Alarmed at
the consequences of this decision both the House ar.d Senate hurried
through the proposed Amendment without debate." The Eleventh
Amendment may, therefore, be said to be an expression of the
doctrine that the individual State in America is sovereign, and sovereignty in America as in England is not sul>ject to judicial control.
Many years passed and a great. civil war settled the problem of
State sovereignty. Rule by a numerical majority of the Nation
prevailed again~t the attempt of a minority to prevent progress.
The results of that strife were written into law, and the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments express a different political
theory from that expressed in the earlier Eleventh. Under the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Federal Supreme Court
has annulled acts of individual States passed under the so-called ·
sovereign powers-police, eminent domain, and taxation.
The old Eleventh is still a part of the Constitution and the doctrine of State sovereignty and State immunity from· suit remain to
trouble the constitutional lawyer. Repudiation of the doctrine of
State sovereignty has modified ~ts original meaning _in the Constitu1 I

Blackstone, Commentaries,

241-2.
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tion. Judicial decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment, with
which it has clashed, have limited its jurisdiction. Each section of
the Constitution, however, J;i.as a proper place in the whole, and it
is, therefore, necessary to construe these two together, if possible,
lo9king at them through fundamental principles of political theory
and constitutional law.
Mr. Justice SHIRAS in-Prout v. Starr,2 phrased as follows this
axiom of coliStitutional construction when the Eleventh Amendment was pleaded in an action against administrative officers: "The
Constitution of the United States, with the several amendments
~ereof, must be regarded as one instrument, all of whose provisions
are to be deemed of equal validity. It would, indeed, be most un
fortunate if the immunity of the individual States from suits by
citizens of other States, provided for in the Eleventh Amendment,
w~re to be interpreted as nullifying those other provisions which
cqnfer power on Congress to regulate commerce among the several
States, which forbid the States from entering into any treaty, alliance or confederation, from passing any bill of attainder, ex post
~acto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or, without
the consent of Congress, from laying any duty of tonnage, entering
into any agreement or compact with other States or from en~ng
in war-all of which provisions existed before the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment, which still exist, and which would be nullified
and made of no effect, if the judicial power of the United States
could not be invoked to protect citizens affected by the passage of
Sta~e laws disregarding those constitutional limitations. Much less
can the Eleventh Ame~dment be successfully pleaded as an invincible barrier to judicial inquiry where the salutary provisions
of the Fourteenth have been disregarded by State enactments. On
the other hand, the judicial power of the United States has not
infrequently been exercised in securing to the several states in
proper cases, the immunity intended by the Eleventh Amendment."
The apparent conflict between the two amendments, evident in
the case that heads this article, may be eliminated by an application
of fundamental principles of sovereignty and separation of powers,
and each be given the proper place in an harmonious whole. A
paragraph from Book XI of the "SPIRIT oF LAws" affords one key:
"Again ther~ is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the_ judge would be then the legislator. Were it
4

2

188 U. S. 53"- at p. 543·
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joined to the executive power the judge might behave with violence
and oppression."
Whether an action against State officers falls within the provisions of the Eleventh or Fourteenth Amendment depends upon
the nature of the subject matter. If it involves a question in its
nature legislative or executive, i. e. public or political, it is subject
to the prohibition of the first; if it involves a question in its nature
judicial, the other may be successfully invoked..
·
The ADAMSON EIGHT HouR LAw may be used to illustrate the
thought. In as far as it is an attempt to control hours of labor
and meet public demands for social and economic justice, it is political and beyond the power of the courts. ·But in as far as it
attempts by legislative decree to prescribe · an arbitrary code of
wages, taking property from one class and giving it to another,
without a judicial investigation of the facts it is a usurpation by
the legislature of judicial power, a deriial of due process of law and
unconstitutional. The nature of the law must determine the validity.
of the court's right of nullification.
The great .MARSHAL!, in i.v!arbury v. Madison8 expressed· this
thought in a different application of the court's power to review
acts of public ·officers:
"Whether the legality of an act of the head of a department be
examinable in a court of justice or not must always depend on the
nature of the act."
"The conclusion from the reasoning is, that where the heads of
departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute ·the will of the President, or rather to act .
in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal
discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear tha,n that their acts
are only politically ex~inable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance
of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself mjured, has a right t6 resort to the laws of his
country for a remedy."
The right of a citizen to sue public officers must depend also
upon the nature of his remedy. That prdblem is clearly one of
the separation of powers. A court cannot inter£ere with executive
officers so long as they act within constitutional limits. It could not
command a legislature to appropriate money to sati,sfy a judgment
it had rendered, ·for the latter has control of the public purse.
When a citizen sets up a proper case and the court has power
to give relief, action against public officers in their official capacities
• 1 Cranch 137, at pp. 165, 166.
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is permissible even though public interests are at stake. In every
such case the State. has in reality been sued. The individual officer
is before. the court for his· own. wrong-doing, his usurpation of
power, and disobedience of private or public law. But the relief
is against him as an agent of the State and the decision of the court
so affects the State that it cannot be said not to be a party to the
action. The procedure is not dangerous, for violation of a constitutional guarantee is essential. Moreover, public policy demands
dficiency and justice from administrative officers.
In Ex parle Young/ the vigorous logic of Mr. Justice lIAiu,AN
i:~cognizes the State as a party: "How else can the State be forbidden by judicial process .to bring actions in its name, except by
constraining the conduct of its officers, its attorneys, and its agents?
And if all such officers, attorneys, and agents are personally subjected to the process of th~ court, so as to forbid their acting in
their behalf, how can it be said ·that the State itself is not subjected
to the jurisdiction of the court as an actual and real defendant?"
'The learned Justice MA't'l'HEWS considered such an action as one
against the individual officer as a wrongdoer:11 "In the discussion
of such questions, the distinction bet:Ween the government of a State
and the State itself is important and should be observed. In common
speech and common apprehension they are usually regarded as identical ;.and as ordinarily the acts of the government are-the acts of the
State, because within the limits of its delegation of power, the government of the State is generally confounded with the State itself,
and often the former is meant when the latttr is mentioned. The. State
itself is an ideal person, intangible, invisible, immutable. The government is an agent, and, within the sphere of f,ts agency, a perfect
representative; but outside of that, it is a lawless usurpation. The
Constitution of the State is the limit of the authority of its government, and both govern.ment and State are subject to the supremacy
of the Constitution of the United States, and of the laws made in
pursuance thereof. * * * That which, therefore, .is unlawful· because made so by the. supreme law, the Constitution of the United
States, is not the word or deed of the State, but is the mere wrong
and trespass· of those individual persons who falsely speak and act
in its name."
Might it not logically be said that there are three parties to an
action against State officers-the aggrieved citizen, the wrongdomg
agent, and the State ·by its court? The State by its judge is enforcing that law which the other agent of the State has disobeyed.
209 U. S. 123, at p. 188.
•Poindexter v. Greenhow, n4 U. S.

4

270,

at pp.
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Its power to compel obedience depends upon the division of powers
in the Constitution. If the case or the relief asked is of a political
character, the citizen has chosen the wrong tribunal. He must resort to Public Opinion. If the case or relief desired is judicial, the
court has the clear power to guarantee to him his constitutional
rights. The Eleventh Amendment is applicable to the first; the
Fourteenth, if the case be within its provisions, to the second.
A review of the important decisions of the United States Su- .
preme Court upon the Eleventh Amendment would seem to indicate that it is not applicable to cases involving the violation of a
citizen's civil rights by an officer. There are several classes of cases
in which a citizen has bee,n protected from a denial of constitutional
rights by public agents.
This protection has been decreed where state officers have deprived a citizen of his· liberty by an unlawful detention in custody.
Here the writ of habeas corpus has been utilized to restore liberty
to the prisoner. An example is Ex parte Royall :8 "That the petitioner is held under the authority of a State cannot affect the question of the power or jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to inquire
into the cause of his commitment, and to discharge him if he is
restrained of his lfberty in violation of the Constitution."
In another class of cases public agents have refused to surrender
to a citizen property in their possession to which he claims title.
Osborn v. Bank,7 United States v. Lee,8 and Tindal v. Wesley,9
represent this type. The case cited at the head of this article most
resembles these. The property of which the contractor has been
deprived cannot be recovered because of its merger with other immovable property. Equitable relief, however, can be given against
the administrative officers and the fund appropriated for the payment of such claims. 'l'he distinction between the case at hand and
those cited is technical.
In each of these three cases it should be noted. that the court
ordered restitution of his property to the complainant citizen. · The
State by its officers was in possession of the property in each case
and asserted title. 'l'hese decisions certainly establish the principle
that mere possession of property by public officers and assertion
of a right to retain possession is not an objection to an action against
the public agents. State officers are sutbject to judicial process even
though the relief granted concerns the title of a State to property
in its possession.
• 117

u. s.

1

241.

9 Wheaton 738•
• 106
196•
• 167
204-

u. s.
u. s.
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·Mr. Justice-MILLER in the Lee case replied to the objection of the
Eleventh Amendment as follows :10
"Looking at the question upon principle, and apart from the authority of adjudged cases, we think it is still clearer that this branch
of the defense cannot be maintained. It seems to be opposed to
all the principles upon which the rights of the citizen, when brought
. info collision with the acts of the government, must be determined.
In such cases there is no safety for the citizen, except in the protection of the judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded
by the officers of the government professing to act in its name."
"The defense stands here solely upon the absolute immunity
from judicial inquiry of every one who asserts authority from the
executive ·branch of the government, however clear· it may be made
that the executive possessed no such power. Not only no such
p()wer is given, but it is absolutely prohibited both to the executive
and the legislative, to deprive any one of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or to take private property without just
compensation."
·The recent cases in which the Fourteenth Amendment has been
declared a limitation on the State'_s immunity from suit are those
involving the regulation of rates. Mr. Justice Hor.MES declared in
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line:n "We may add that when the rate
is fixed, a bill against the commission to restrain the members from
enforcing it will not be bad as an attempt to enjoin legislation or
as a suit against a State, and will be the proper form of remedy."
Other cases are "Reagan v. Far.mers' Loan and Trust Co.,12 Smyth
v. Ames,1 8 Prout v. Starr,1'' and Ex parte Y oung.15 All of these
adjudications indicate the power of a court ·of equity to protect
the constitutional rights of a citizen against governmental agencies.
Granted a right to protection and a jurisdiction over the wrong·doers, a court can clearly grant any relief which its arsenal contains.
The cases in which Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution and
the Eleventh Amendment have .clashed illustrate a distinction between clear civil rights of a citizen and other less certain rights
involving a political element not protected by constitutional guarantees. They can only be reconciled by MARSHALL'S classification
of civil and political acts cited ante.
SI 106
U 2II

U, S.
U. S.

196',
2IO,

22 154 U. 5. 362•
.. 16g
466.
.. 188
537·
:II 209

u. s.
u. s.
u. s. 123-

at pp.

218-19, 2:20.
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In Davis v. Gray,16 the court said: "When a State becomes a
party to a contract, as in the case before us, the same rules of law
are applied to her as to private persons under like circumstances.
When she and her representatives are properly ·brought into the
forum of litigation, neither she nor th.ey can assert ·any right or
immunity as incident to her political sovereignty."
Poindexter v. Greenhow,17 recognizes the same doctrine: "And
how else can these principles of individual liberty and right •be
maintained, if, when violated the judicial tribunals ~re forbidden
to visit penalties upon individual offenders, who are the instruments of wrong, whenever they interpose the shield of the State?
The doctrine is not to be tolerated."
"'The mandate. of the State affords no justification for the invasion of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States;
otherwise that constitution would not be the supreme law of. the
land."
.
Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R.,18 reiterates the doctrine:
"Where the rights in jeopardy are those of private citizens and
are of those classes which the Constitution of the United States
either c0nfers or has taken under its protection, and no adequate
remedy for their enforcement is provided by the forms and proceedings purely· legal, the same necessity invokes and justifies, in
cases in which its remedies can be applied, that jurisdiction in equity
vested by the Constitution of the United States, and which cannot
be affected by the legislation of the States."
Public officers in all of these cases were restrained from doing
acts which violated contracts to which the State was a party. Constitutional guarantees were violated and public officers were reprimanded for the violation. The Eleventh Amendment was ignored
and properly ignored.
There is another kind of contract which the Supreme Court has
refused to_ enforce against the objection of the State's immunity.
from suit. It is found in Louisiana v. Jumel,19 Hagood v. Southem,20 and In re Ayers.21 In each of these controversies a right was
recognized in the State superior to an individual's appeal for the
protection of his property. They are an expression of the political
power of a State to ignore the claims of some particular class of
citizens when the welfare of the entire citizenship is concerned. On
u 16 Wall. 203, at p. 232.
1r II4 U. S. 270, at pp. 29r, 292.
Un4 U. S. 3n, at pp. 316, 317.
11 107 U. S. 7n.
" 117 u. s. 52.
123
443.

=
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questions of policy peculiarly within the province of the faw-making
body, its commands uttered in the form of laws are an expression
of the will of the sovereign electorate binding on the courts them-·
selves. 'I'he only question ·before the court is the nature of the actlegislative and political or civil and judicial.
The following quotation from Louisiana v. Juniel22 illustrates the
thought:
"The question, then, is whether the contract can be enforced, not:.
withstanding the Constitution, by coercing the agents and officers
of the State, whose aut4ority ·has been withdrawn in violation of the
~~mtract, without the State itself in its political capacity being a
party to the proceedings.
"The relief asked will require the officers against whom the process is issued to act contrary to the positive orders of the supreme
political power of the State, whose creatures they are, and to which
they are ultimately responsible in law for what they do. They must
use the public money in the treasury and under their official control
in o:r,ie way, when the supreme power has directed them to use it in
another, and they must raise more money by taxation when the same
power has declared that it shall not be done."
-Mr. Justice MAT'tHEws in the Hagood case decided that there was
no ~reach of c.ontract and it was not a case where "personal and
property rights" had been violated by public officers. The same
judge in the Ayers case said that no contract had been violated, the
subject matter was not within the jurisdiction of the court, and the
remedy on this kind of a contract was not protected.
Viewed ·from the standpoint of public rescission the contract of
In re Ayers is the same kind of a contract as that of the following
cases: Beer Co. v. Massachusetts,23 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,2"
Stone v. Mississippi; 25 Illinois R. R. v. Illinois. 26 It is a property
right subject to restriction by an exercise of sovereignty b)' governmental agencies under mandates from the elecforate. The grant
of the privilege is repeatable whenever the same public interest that
called it forth demands its repeal. Sovereignty cannot be bargained
away to one member or one group of the State.
The Eleventh Amendment may be said to be an expression of
sovereignty's immunity from judicial control. In these United
States a sovereign electorate rather than a sovereign King utters
the command. When that command has crystallized into law, no
,. Io7 U. S. 7n, at p. 72I.
,. 97 u. s. 25•
.. 97 u. s. 659.
:II IOI U. 5. 79•
• I46
387.

u. s.
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Supreme Court has a power of nullification, even though it force a
reorganization of society, or introduce a new and different conception of private right. No individual or group in a democracy has
a constitutional right to the perpetuity of any prevailing social, political, or economic theory. Public rights are greater than private
rights. Nor is this a new doctrine. It is the right of political
revolution proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence and made
possible through peaceful and legal channels by the recognition in
the Federal Constitution of rule by the numerical majority.
An attempt has been made in this article to apply fundamental
principles of political and constitutional theory to conflicting clau~es
of our Constitution. The immunity of a State from suit and its
officers from court process set up ·by the Attorney General in the
case cited cannot be said .to be the correct theory of the Ametjcan
system of government. In some cases constitutional guarantees
demand that a citizen be allowed court process against public officers
even though the State in its organic capacity is affected thereby•
. In other cases, such relief would deny to the American people the
right of political revolution through legal channels, leaving sovereign
powers in the hands of a few monarchs of the bench.
.
· The Fourteenth Amendment may be said to be applicabte to all
cases where public officers through ignorance or malice deny to a
citizen his right to life, liberty, ·or property. The Eleventh Amendment properly covers all cases involving political questions, especially conflicts between public and private right. In the words of
MoN'tSSQU!EU: "There is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not
separated from the legislative and executive."
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